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CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA
THE CONTINUING DEBATE OF CONTINUING TORT: THE
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE
CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE IN HOGG V. CHEVRON
USA, INC.
Mark Assad *
On July 6, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided an
important installment in the debate surrounding the proper
application of the continuing tort doctrine. 1 The court held that,
under Louisiana law, the continuing tort doctrine suspends
prescription if the operating cause, defined by the majority as the
initial tortious act of the defendant rather than the subsequent
effects, is continuing in nature.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs brought suit against neighboring property owners,
Chevron USA, Inc., and the operator of the service station located
thereon, alleging property damage resulting from leaking gasoline
tanks located beneath the service station. 2 On discovering the leaks
in 1997, defendant replaced the tanks. In 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs
received two letters from the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ) apprising them of the gasoline
contamination in the area surrounding the service station and
informing the plaintiffs that LDEQ may ask permission to perform
environmental tests on their property in the future. On September

* Candidate, J.D. and Diploma in Comparative Law (2013), Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 2010), 45 So. 3d 991.
2. Id.
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12, 2006, the plaintiffs were contacted concerning access to their
property for the purpose of conducting remediation.
On September 6, 2007, the plaintiffs filed suit against the
defendants under the tort theory of trespass “seeking damages for
diminution of the value of their property, the stigma of owning
contaminated property, loss of enjoyment of use of the property,
and exemplary damages.” 3 The plaintiffs argued that the presence
of the gasoline, the defendants’ failure to remove it, and the ill
effects sustained resulted in a viable claim in trespass under
Louisiana tort law. Defendants subsequently filed motions for
summary judgment asserting plaintiff’s action was barred by the
one-year liberative prescription pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3492 and 3493. Defendants argued that plaintiffs were
aware of the damage from the letters received in 2001 and 2002,
and therefore prescription began to run upon receipt of those
letters. 4 Plaintiffs argued the letters were subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was inappropriate
because the reasonableness of their interpretation was an issue of
material fact to be decided at trial. 5 The district court agreed with
the plaintiffs and denied the defendant’s motions for summary
judgment. 6 The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, declined the
defendant’s application for supervisory writ; however, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently granted writs to review
the district court’s denial of summary judgment. 7
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed two primary issues
in its decision. First, the Court had to decide whether or not the
LDEQ letters sent to plaintiffs were sufficient to give them actual
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 28 So. 3d 263 (La. 2010).
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or constructive knowledge of the contamination such that
prescription began to run upon the plaintiffs’ receipt of the letters.
Second, the Court addressed the continuing tort doctrine and
whether or not it was applicable to the facts before the Court.
Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that “there is no
question as to what the plaintiffs knew and when [they knew it]”
because the “[p]laintiffs’ knowledge is contained in the letters.” 8 A
plain reading of the letters, according to the Court, clearly
indicated that there was soil and groundwater contamination in the
area surrounding the service station; therefore, there was no issue
of material fact regarding whether or not this amounted to actual or
constructive knowledge. 9 Instead, the Court framed the issue as
whether or not the plaintiffs’ knowledge from the letters
constitutes actual or constructive knowledge such that prescription
began to run upon their receipt. 10 Because the dispute concerns
whether or not the letters amount to actual or constructive
knowledge and not what the substance of the letters contained, the
Court found that summary judgment was appropriate. 11
In addressing whether the doctrine of continuing tort would
suspend prescription for the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court first
addressed plaintiffs’ assertion that the presence of the gasoline on
their property was a trespass, and its continued presence was, in
fact, continuing tortious activity by the defendants. 12 The Court
also distinguished continuous and discontinuous operating causes,
relying on Crump v. Sabine River Authority, where the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated, “[a] continuing tort is occasioned by
[continual] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of
an original, wrongful act.” 13 Applying this standard to the present
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
728.

Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326 (La. 1999), 737 So. 2d 720,
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case, the Court held that the operating cause of the injury was the
leaking of the gasoline out of the tanks, which was abated in 1997,
rather than the continued presence of the gasoline on the
property. 14 Therefore, the tortious activity alleged by plaintiffs
ceased in 1997 and the continuing ill effects of that conduct does
not suspend the running of prescription under the doctrine of
continuing tort. However, prescription did not begin to run until
years later because plaintiffs were not made aware of the injury
until the letters were received in 2001 and 2002. 15 Nevertheless,
plaintiffs’ suit, filed in 2007, was not within the one-year
prescriptive period for tort actions. 16
III. COMMENTARY
First, the procedural posture of the case is worth noting. The
appeal was from a motion for summary judgment that was denied
at the trial court, thus the question was whether or not there was a
genuine issue of material fact in existence such that judgment
could not be rendered as a matter of law. 17 Overturning the trial
court’s ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, because
there was no issue of material fact regarding when the plaintiffs
acquired actual or constructive knowledge, summary judgment was
appropriate. 18 The only question left after this factual
determination was whether or not the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, which the court found it was through
14. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1006.
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493 provides: “[w]hen damage is caused to
immovable property, the one year prescription commences to run from the day
the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of
the damage.”
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 provides in pertinent part that “[d]elictual
actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year.” In the context of this
case, the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code art. 3493, id. note 15, apply as to
when the one-year liberative prescription commences.
17. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 966(B) (2011). The article provides that
summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to material
fact, and … [the] mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
18. Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 1006.
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the correct interpretation of the continuing tort doctrine. For the
purposes of this note, the court’s treatment of the continuing tort
doctrine is the central issue to be considered.
The plaintiffs argued for the application of the continuing tort
doctrine in order to circumvent prescription. 19 The plaintiffs
characterized the presence of the gasoline as a trespass and
asserted, consequently, that the trespass continued as long as the
gasoline remained on the property. The Court acknowledged this
argument and summarily dismissed it for two reasons. First, the
Court questioned whether the leaking of the gasoline was a
trespass at all because there was little evidence that the defendants
intended the gasoline to enter plaintiffs’ land. 20 The Court only
briefly questioned whether or not the gasoline’s presence was a
trespass at all because a final determination on that issue was not
necessary to address the continuing tort doctrine and prescription.
As the Court noted, the issue of whether or not an underground
leak falls within trespass, nuisance, neither, or both, is more
appropriate for another discussion.
Second, the Court stated that defining the presence of the
gasoline as continuing tortious activity in the form of a trespass
would render trespass “an imprescriptible species of tort, an
argument at odds with the plain language of Louisiana Civil Code
arts. 3492 and 3493, which makes no exception of trespass….” 21
The majority’s position on this issue is well grounded in light of
the plain meaning of the prescription articles, which make no
indication that an expansive reading is appropriate. In fact, the
Official Revision Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code art. 3492

19. The applicable liberative prescription period in delictual actions is
generally one year pursuant to LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. See supra note 16.
20. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1002 (the Court specifically states in n.11 that “civil
trespass is generally considered to be an intentional tort, requiring proof that the
defendant took some intentional action that resulted in harm to the plaintiff.”).
21. Id. at 1002, n.12.
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states that the one-year prescription applies to all delictual
actions. 22
The decision turns on how to define the operating cause of the
damage, and the majority opinion is consistent with jurisprudence
regarding the continuing tort doctrine. 23 The Louisiana Civil Code
offers no guidance regarding the continuing tort doctrine, which
has developed primarily through jurisprudence. In Crump, 24 the
Louisiana Supreme Court defined the operating cause of the injury
in order to determine the applicability of the continuing tort
doctrine. In that case, the defendants created a canal on land
adjacent to the plaintiff’s, which caused continued flooding on the
plaintiff’s land. The Court held that the operating cause was
digging the canal - not the water that was spilled onto plaintiff’s
land. 25 Instead, the Court characterized the water that remained on
plaintiff’s land as the “continuing ill effects arising from a single
tortuous act.” 26 The initial act of digging the canal was the
operating cause of the injury suffered, not the continued presence
of the water on the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court
presented the issue as a problem of determining where the line
between cause and effect was drawn, and essentially held that only
the initial act should be considered the operating cause of the
injury suffered within the context of the continuing tort doctrine.
Justice Knoll’s dissent argues in favor of considering the
presence of the gasoline a continuing tort that would suspend
prescription, which differs from the majority position that views
the “operating cause” of the tortious effects as only the initial act
of the defendants. Justice Weimer, writing for the majority, defines
22. Id.
23. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 234
(reaffirming the holding in Hogg, supra note 1); Crump v. Sabine River
Authority, 98-2326 (La. 1999), 737 So. 2d 720; South Central Bell Telephone
Company v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So. 2d 531 (La. 1982); Mouton v. State of
Louisiana, 525 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 1112
(La. 1988).
24. Crump, 737 So. 2d at 728.
25. Id. at 731.
26. Id. at 728.
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the operating cause of the injury as the actual leaking of the
gasoline from the tanks. In contrast, Justice Knoll’s position is that
the continued presence of the gasoline is causing the harmful
effects to plaintiffs and therefore the presence should be
considered the cause of the injury suffered. The fundamental
question of where to draw the line for cause and effect 27 is
apparently still contentious among current Justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The majority’s holding, aligned with Louisiana
Supreme Court jurisprudence, considers the leak from the tanks the
initial, operating cause of the injury, and therefore it alone is the
tortious activity in the present case. Consequently, the
contamination of plaintiffs’ land itself is the injury, or the effect, of
the operating cause along with any additional effects that may arise
as a result of the leak.
In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s past rulings
regarding the doctrine of continuing tort and the holding in this
case, there is a clear indication that the Court is unwilling to
expand the prescriptive period beyond the initial act (or acts)
constituting the operating cause of the injury. The prescriptive
period in such cases begins to run as soon as the defendant’s
tortious conduct ceases and the plaintiff knows or should know of
the damage caused by the act.
However, it is worth noting that Louisiana is not alone in its
confusion over the appropriate circumstances for the continuing
tort doctrine’s application. For example, in Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 28
the federal Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio’s continuing trespass
doctrine requires no showing of continuing conduct, but rather
27. The question of whether the continuing conduct (cause) or the
continuing damage (effect) is the proper method of defining a continuing tort is
recognized in national sources as an area that is generally unsettled. See 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 223 (2012) (“Under the continuing tort doctrine,
where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does
not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious acts
cease…”) (emphasis added). The use of the “or” demonstrates the rift in
jurisdictions’ analysis for defining a continuing tort.
28. 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997).

246

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

only a showing of continuing damage. Interestingly, Judge
Krupansky’s dissent mirror’s the Louisiana Supreme Court
majority’s reasoning in Hogg, noting that “[o]ngoing conduct is the
key to a continuing tort. Where no continuing action by the
defendant is necessary to effect the damage in controversy—that
is, where the tort is an accomplished fact, such as when intangible
pollutants have impacted the plaintiff's property…—the tort is
permanent” and thus prescribed.

